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43 July 1957

MEMORANDUM FOR: Project Security Officer

THROUGH

: Project Director of Administration

SUBJECT

: Security Survey of RAINBOW Facilities at

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- 1. I have read this report and I am returning it herewith with my concurrence. I do wish, however, to elaborate on the recommendation therein contained.
- 2. My feeling is that the best if not the only way to maintain security about many activities connected with the RAINBOW program is to allow them to seem to be normal, unclassified activities rather than to protect them with physical security controls. The reason I am led to this view is that, especially in view of the history of the Project, it is simply impossible physically to conceal, or to prevent the access of unauthorised persons to, locations and production operations.

25X1A6a 25X1A5a1 3. I feel we have deliberately and carefully taken this approach with respect to the application of RAINBOW materials to the aircraft. In I believe we should take the same approach. It seems to me entirely feasible, since it is not unusual for the coating various types of paper or other bases with mixtures employing commercial solvents and requiring heat treatment. This fortunate circumstance makes it highly unlikely that unauthorized personnel who enter the production facility will see anything (except perhaps test equipment) which will either seem unusual or suggest the true nature and purpose of the operation. In the case of the electronics equipment, I feel we will be very well advised to have a very simple, brief cover story to explain its presence.

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4. The great danger that concerns me in the is not what unauthorized persons will see but what they will hear. It is terribly easy for a group of men who are working together day after day to fall into the

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habit of talking about their work in a manner highly compromising if continued in the presence of unauthorized personnel. Although the people concerned in the presence almost surely too careful to fall into this simple error, I am convinced that they have allowed a number of unauthoxized people who are frequent visitors to the true gradually to tearn the true nature of the activity. I hope we have by now caught up with and briefed all of these people but the dauger remains of similar piecemeal and gradual compromise.

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- 5. I would suggest, therefore, that the first tightening of security that should be imposed in the security that should be imposed in the security is a careful indoctrination of personnel with frequent access to the concerning their conversation when any unauthorised individuals are present.
- 6. As to the control of physical access to the area, I wonder if this could not be done more unobtrusively by posting a list of authorized personnel than by attempting to institute a system of badges or other arrangements which would arouse curiosity in

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RICHARD M. BISSELL, JR. Project Director

Attachment:

Copy 1, SAPC-12861/R

RMB:gjg (22 July 57)

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